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1 Introduction
It is well known that entrepreneurship plays an essential role in several economic
activities. When new technology is discovered, when demographic change occurs or
when a government changes its policy, it is entrepreneurs who react to the changes
and reallocate resources to seek opportunities. However, there have been only a few
attempts to develop a formal model of entrepreneurship in macroeconomics. The
absence of entrepreneurship from macroeconomics can be explained in part by the
extensive use of an exogenously given aggregate production function. As the relation
between output and inputs is given by the aggregate production function, there is no
need for an economic agent who finds a productive use for inputs.
Of course, we agree that the aggregate production function contains many useful
properties in macroeconomics. In particular, it can account for the main features of
economic growth in many OECD countries. However, recent evidence from plant-
level data suggests that the weaknesses of the traditional aggregate production func-
tion may not be negligible. This evidence shows that the reallocation of resources
towards more productive uses is an important component of productivity growth [see
reviews by, e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000)].
The usefulness of the aggregate production function will be greatly improved if we
can incorporate the ability to allocate resources in the aggregate production function.
This paper models a firm’s entrepreneurial ability by the ability to predict changes
in the productivity of that firm (i.e., a firm’s prediction ability), and analyze how en-
trepreneurship influences an aggregate economy, where entrepreneurship is defined as
the activity of allocating resources to size opportunities. In this model, the aggregate
production function is derived from firms’ reactions to these changes. Therefore, we
can analyze how firms’ prediction ability affects the macroeconomy, while retaining
the advantages of the aggregate production function.
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Although economists estimate productivity from data, in reality, it is never ob-
served. It has to be predicted by managers. Individual managers can observe a
sequence of changes in the environment and predict what might influence their pro-
duction or sales. They might observe that traffic in their local area increases, that
new firms attract many skillful engineers to their firms or that a politician who is
connected with their company loses an election. Since productivity is estimated by
the ratio of measured output to input, all of them can potentially influence measured
productivity. Hence, predicting a change in the productivity of their own firm means
predicting how various changes in the environment directly influence production or
sales. That is, prediction ability in this paper aims to capture the soundness of firms’
judgment about economic impacts of the changes.
When a change in productivity occurs, the marginal products of inputs deviate
from input prices, and this generates opportunities for entrepreneurs to exploit. If
entrepreneurs appropriately predict the change and react to it, the deviation of the
marginal products of the inputs from input prices will be small. Hence, the improve-
ment in firms’ prediction ability raises allocative efficiency, and therefore increases
productivity in the economy. It is shown that the increased prediction ability of
firms raises the total factor productivity (TFP) of the aggregate production function
in a competitive economy.
This result does not apply if opportunities are distorted. As the social marginal
products of resources differ from the private marginal products, even if a talented en-
trepreneur can equate private marginal products to input prices, this may not improve
allocative efficiency. This intuition is analyzed formally in the context of entrepre-
neurs seeking rent. Because the results of political negotiations are uncertain, entre-
preneurs must respond to changes in the political environment. However, because
rent-seeking activities simply redistribute incomes, adapting to political changes gen-
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erates negative externalities: when an entrepreneur is good at taking opportunities,
there are fewer opportunities for others. It is shown that increased firms’ prediction
ability can lower TFP.
A similar view of entrepreneurs is emphasized by Kirzner (1973) and Schultz
(1975). Kirzner (1973) emphasizes the essential role of entrepreneurial discovery in
market processes. Schultz (1975) defines entrepreneurial ability as the ability to in-
terpret new information and allocate resources to profitable opportunities. Although
both researchers insist that equilibrium analysis is not suitable for understanding the
importance of entrepreneurship, we suggest that there are benefits of using an equi-
librium model. Hence, we represent similar aspects of entrepreneurship in a general
equilibrium model, and it is hoped that this approach complements theirs.
This strategy has been adopted by Holmes and Schmitz (1990) and Takii (2003a).
Holmes and Schmitz (1990) incorporate a Schultzian entrepreneur into an equilibrium
analysis, and emphasize the importance of the division of labor between entrepreneurs
and managers. Takii (2003a) examines the allocation of prediction ability in a market
economy. This paper differs from theirs in two respects: (1) it identifies a social role
of entrepreneurship as influencing allocative efficiency; and (2) it incorporates this
role into the aggregate production function. Since the aggregate production function
is a cornerstone of the neoclassical growth model, the model potentially can be applied
to broad topics.
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the model, we extend the model to an-
alyze the effect of rent-seeking activities on an aggregate economy. The result con-
tributes to a controversy in the literature on pressure groups. Becker (1983) shows
that competition between pressure groups can lead to efficient allocation. On the
other hand, Tullock (1967) argues that rent-seeking activities waste resources. The
detrimental effect of entrepreneurs’ rent-seeking activities has recently been reempha-
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sized in the context of economic growth [e.g., by Baumol (1990), Murphy et al. (1991)
and Holmes and Schmitz (2001)]. In contrast to the previous literature, this paper
shows that, even if rent-seeking activities are costless, competition between pressure
groups may not lead to efficient allocation in the presence of political risk. Hence,
the social welfare loss due to rent-seeking activities may have been underestimated
by the existing literature.
The negative effect of prediction ability on TFP also has an alternative impli-
cation. Since prediction ability is determined by the accuracy of information, the
result means that accurate information can reduce welfare. Blackwell (1953) shows
that accurate information always improves a decision maker’s ex ante utility in an
individual decision problem. On the other hand, Hirshleifer (1971) points out that
accurate information can lower welfare in a pure exchange economy because it makes
risk sharing more difficult. Eckwert and Zilcha (2001) introduce a production sec-
tor and investigate a trade-off between the welfare gain due to a better allocation of
resources and the welfare loss due to worse risk sharing. This paper provides an al-
ternative reason why accurate information lowers welfare: more accurate information
can aggravate distortion in a distorted economy.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section
3 defines the measure of prediction ability and analyzes the macroeconomic effect of
firms’ prediction ability. Section 4 extends the model to analyze the effect of political
uncertainty. Section 5 concludes by summarizing the main results and discussing
possible extensions.
2 The Model
We present a simple general equilibrium model, which is based on that of Lucas
(1978). It lays the foundations for analyzing the macroeconomic effect of entrepre-
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neurship in the next section.
An agent can be an entrepreneur or a worker. Each firm needs one entrepreneur
to organize the firm. In this model, for simplicity, there is no distinction between
entrepreneurs, managers and firms. This simplification is made to develop a tractable
model that focuses on firms’ entrepreneurship.
Firms are continuously distributed on [0,mN ], where m ∈ (0, 1) is the proportion
of entrepreneurs in the total population, N . This implies that agents are assumed
to be identical. Although the lack of heterogeneity among entrepreneurs forces us to
ignore the distributional aspect of the original model in Lucas (1978), it allows us to
focus on a different economic problem: the effect of entrepreneurship on productivity
in an economy. In fact, owing to this simplification we derive a rather simple con-
dition that the derived aggregate production function exhibits concavity and Inada
conditions, which are essential assumptions for the neoclassical growth model.
The representative entrepreneur’s problem is described first, and then the market
equilibrium is defined.
The entrepreneur’s problem: An entrepreneur establishes a firm, employs capi-
tal stock and workers, and produces output. The entrepreneur faces the following
production function:
Yi = zi [F (Ki, Li)]
α , 0 < α < 1
where zi is a firm-specific productivity shock for the ith firm, and Yi, Ki and Li
are the amounts of the ith firm’s output, capital stock and labor input, respectively.
It is assumed that F exhibits constant returns to scale in K and L. By defining
f (k) = F (k, 1), where k = K
L
, we can express F (K,L) as a function of capital per
worker in production: F (K,L) = f (k)L. We assume that f 0 (.) > 0, f 00 (.) < 0,
limk→0 f (k) = 0, limk→0 f 0 (k) = ∞ and limk→∞ f 0 (k) = 0. The parameter α
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measures the span of control. Because α ∈ (0, 1), the production function has
decreasing returns to scale in Ki and Li.
Idiosyncratic changes occur everywhere in reality. However, some influence pro-
ductivity; others not. The random shock zi summarizes changes in productivity
due to all idiosyncratic changes. Because the movement of zi is unpredictable ex
ante, when zi changes the entrepreneur must predict the direction and magnitude
of this change to respond appropriately. When the entrepreneur makes production
decisions, she does not observe zi, but does observe a noisy signal, si, from which the
realization of zi can be inferred. It is assumed that the entrepreneur’s inference is
based on a conditional distribution function, Qh (z|s), where h measures the entre-
preneur’s ability to predict changes in z. The conditional distribution function is the
same for all entrepreneurs. It implies that all entrepreneurs share the same knowl-
edge about the relation between the productivity shock and the observable signal. A
more detailed information structure is specified subsequently.
Note that z is assumed to be an idiosyncratic shock. Hence, the information
required to infer z must be local information. That is, entrepreneurs must process
their local information. However, as both z and s are idiosyncratic, prices in this
model do not depend on them. Hence, prices are predictable without knowing what
others observe. That is, entrepreneurs do not need to know all the local information
in an economy because the price system summarizes the information they need. This
is essentially the view of Hayek (1945). In this sense, this paper incorporates Hayek’s
(1945) arguments into the neoclassical growth model, and examines the social effect
of local information.
It is assumed that the financial market is complete. Therefore, entrepreneurs can
hedge against any idiosyncratic risk. Entrepreneurs maximize their firm’s expected
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profits:
π (si) = max
k,L
½Z
zi [f (ki)Li]
α dQh (zi|si)− wLi − rkiLi
¾
,
where w is the wage rate and r is the rental price of capital. The first-order conditions
are:
w = α
Z
zidQ
h (zi|si) [f (k (si))L (si)]α−1 f (k (si))− rk (si) , (1)
r = α
Z
zidQ
h (zi|si) [f (k (si))L (si)]α−1 f 0 (k (si)) , (2)
for any s, where k (s) and L (s) are the optimal levels of k and L. Because the
production function is strictly concave in k and L and satisfies the Inada conditions,
there exists a unique interior solution, and the first-order conditions are necessary
and sufficient for the maximization problem.
Note that the two first-order conditions imply that entrepreneurs equate the wage
rate (rental price) to the expected marginal product of labor (capital), not to the
actual marginal product of labor (capital). Idiosyncratic shocks cause marginal
products to deviate from marginal costs, and these deviations provide opportunities
for entrepreneurs to exploit. If entrepreneurs predict the direction and magnitude of
the changes clearly, they can take the opportunities. This is the aspect of entrepre-
neurship that we emphasize in this model, and that is also stressed by Kirzner (1973)
and Schultz (1975).
The following is derived from the two first-order conditions:
w
r
=
f (k (si))− f 0 (k (si)) k (si)
f 0 (k (si))
. (3)
This equation implies that the capital stock per worker in production k (si) does not
depend on the realization of the signal si. Hence, we denote this by k. As the
right-hand side of equation (3) is strictly increasing in k, k is uniquely determined by
w
r
.
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Expected profits are derived by substituting the two first-order conditions into
π (si): Z
π (s) dQhs (s) =
(1− α)
α
(w + rk)
Z
L (s) dQhs (s) . (4)
Equation (4) shows that expected profits are proportional to the costs of production.
The arbitrage condition: Because entrepreneurs can completely hedge their risks
in the financial market, they do not bear risk. As agents are identical and can be
entrepreneurs or workers, expected profits must be equal to the opportunity cost of
being an entrepreneur, which is the wage rate in the labor market.
Z
π (s) dQhs (s) = w. (5)
Hence, equations (4) and (5) imply
w =
(1− α)
α
(w + rk)
Z
L (s) dQhs (s) . (6)
Resource constraints: To close the model, the labor and capital markets must
clear:
Ka = mNkT
Z
L (s) dQhs (s) , (7)
(1−m)N = mN
Z
L (s) dQhs (s) , (8)
where Ka is the aggregate capital stock. Equation (7) is the capital market clearing
condition. The left-hand side is the supply of capital and the right-hand side is the
demand for capital: mN is the number of firms and k
R
L (st) dQ (st) is the average
firm’s demand for capital. Equation (8) is the labor market clearing condition. The
left-hand side is the supply of labor and the right-hand side is the demand for labor.
Market equilibrium: Market equilibrium can be formally defined as follows:
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Definition 1 A market equilibrium is {L (·) , k, w, r,m} that satisfies the following
conditions.
1. The firm’s profit maximization conditions: equations (1) and ( 3).
2. The arbitrage condition: equation (6).
3. The resource constraints: equations (7) and (8).
Let us define θ (k) = f
0(k)k
f(k)
. The following theorem proves the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 Suppose that limk→∞ θ (k) < 1. Then, for any ka ≡ K
a
N
∈ (0,∞) , a
unique market equilibrium exists.
When many agents become entrepreneurs, few are employees. This increases
the demand for employees and reduces the supply of employees. The wage rate
is determined so that demand equals supply, which guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium. The assumption limk→∞ θ (k) < 1 is a technical one. When fewer
agents become employees, k is larger. This condition implies that as k becomes
infinite, the labor share does not converge to 0. That is, the wage rate must increase
at a faster rate than employment falls in the limit. This guarantees that m has a
solution in (0, 1).
The aggregate production function: Now we derive the aggregate production
function. Let ya denote aggregate output per capita. The following proposition
shows that entrepreneurs’ ability to predict changes in the productivity of the firms
can influence the TFP of the aggregate production function. The proof is given in
the Appendix.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that limk→∞ θ (k) < 1. Then for any ka ∈ (0,∞), there
exists an aggregate production function:
ya = z (h)φ (ka) (9)
where z (h) ≡
"Z ∙Z
zdQh (z|s)
¸ 1
1−α
dQhs (s)
#(1−α)
,
φ (ka) ≡ f
Ã
ka
1−m (ka)
!α
m (ka)(1−α) [1−m (ka)]α ,
and m (ka) ∈ (0, 1) is a solution of
α
1− α
"
1− θ
Ã
ka
1−m
!#
=
1−m
m
.
This proposition shows that h affects the TFP of the aggregate production func-
tion, but says nothing about the direction of the effect. Before examining the effect
of h on TFP, it is useful to show the properties of the aggregate production func-
tion. The following proposition shows that the derived aggregate production function
satisfies the traditional assumptions of macroeconomics. The proof is given in the
Appendix.
Proposition 4 Suppose that limk→∞ θ (k) < 1 and limk→0 θ (k) < 1. Then the
derived aggregate production function is increasing and concave in ka ∈ (0,∞), and
satisfies the Inada conditions:
φ0 (ka) > 0, φ00 (ka) < 0.
lim
ka→0
φ (ka) = 0, lim
ka→∞
φ0 (ka) = 0 and lim
ka→0
φ0 (ka) =∞
Both concavity and satisfaction of the Inada conditions are essential to the exis-
tence of a globally stable unique steady state in the neoclassical growth model. That
is, the derived aggregate production function satisfies all the important assumptions
of the aggregate production function in the neoclassical growth model.
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3 TheMacroeconomic Effects of Entrepreneurship
In this section, we specify the information structure that entrepreneurs can access,
and we examine the macroeconomic effects of entrepreneurship. TFP, z (h), is shown
to be an increasing function of prediction ability.
Since a firm’s prediction ability is determined by the accuracy of information,
it can be expressed by informativeness, in the sense of Blackwell (1953). Without
loss of generality, the distribution functions are assumed to be continuous and the
conditional distribution Qh(zi|si) can be derived from
dQh(zi|si)
dzi
= qhz/s(zi|si),
qhz/s(zi|si) =
qhs/z(si|zi)qz(zi)R
qhs/z(si|zi)qz(zi)dzi
,
where qhs/z(si|zi) is a conditional density function given ziand qz(zi) is a prior density
function zi. Assume that h is ordered by the informativeness, in the sense of Blackwell
(1953). That is, h1 ≥ h2 if and only if there exists a nonnegative function φ (s2i |s1i ),
which satisfies the following three relations:Z
φ
³
s2i |s1i
´
ds2i = 1, a.e. ∀s1i ,Z
φ
³
s2i |s1i
´
qh
1
s/z
³
s1i |zi
´
ds1i = q
h2
s/z
³
s2i |zi
´
, a.e. ∀zi,∀s2iZ
φ
³
s2i |s1i
´
ds1i ∈ (0,∞) , a.e. ∀s2i .
Blackwell (1953) proves that if h is ordered by this criterion, information structure
h1 brings higher ex ante utility than information structure h2 for any utility func-
tion. Using Blackwell’s (1953) definition of informativeness, it is shown that z (h) is
increasing in h.
Theorem 5 If h is ordered by informativeness in the sense of Blackwell (1953), then
z (h) is increasing in h.
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Proof. As Eh [zi|si]
1
1−α is convex in Eh [zi|si] and Eh [zi|si] is convex in qhz/s (zi|si),
Eh [zi|si]
1
1−α is convex in qhz/s (zi|si). From Theorem 2 in DeGroot (1970, p. 436),
the result is immediate.
The result shows that if firms have more accurate information, the productivity
of the economy increases. When changes in productivity occur, if entrepreneurs
can accurately predict the direction and magnitude of the changes, the deviations
of actual marginal productivities of inputs from input prices will be small. Hence,
an improvement in firms’ prediction ability raises allocative efficiency, and therefore
increases the productivity of the economy.
The Operational Measure of h: In order to make the model more operational, we
make a further assumption on information structure. Assume that log z comprises a
predictable component µ and an unpredictable component u:
log z = µ+ u
where u is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2u. It is assumed that
the unpredictable component u summarizes a change in productivity. The signal s
is correlated with u with an error:
s = u+ ε
where ε is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2ε (h). We can apply
Takii’s (2003a) measure of prediction ability in this context. Let Qhu (u|s) denote the
conditional distribution of u given s. The measure of prediction ability , u, is defined
as follows.
Definition 6 The measure of prediction ability about u is defined by:
h = 1−
R
V ar (u|s) dQhs (s)
σ2u
,
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where V ar (u|s) = R ³u− R udQhu (u|s)´2 dQhu (u|s).
This measure implies that the entrepreneur accurately predicts u when she re-
duces on average the conditional variance having observed s. To compare ability
in different environments,
R
V ar (u|s) dQhs (s) is divided by σ2u, which is the uncondi-
tional variance of u. The measure h ranges from 0 to 1. If the entrepreneur perfectly
predicts u, h = 1, whereas if the entrepreneur does not predict u at all, h = 0.
Using the definition of h, the variance of the noise term is endogenously determined
as follows:
σ2ε (h) =
(1− h)σ2u
h
. (10)
As expected, when the entrepreneur more accurately predicts u, the variance of the
noise term is smaller. When h = 1, the variance is 0, and when h = 0, the variance
is infinite.
An advantage of this measure is that it can be estimated. The proof is found in
Takii (2004).
Proposition 7 In the steady state, the measure of prediction ability, h, can be es-
timated by the correlation between log Y − α logL − logw and logL, where α =
1R
[ Y (z,s)rK(s)+wL(s) ]dQhzs(z,s)
.
The correlation measure reflects the value of unobserved local information, the im-
portance of which is emphasized by Hayek (1945). Note that log Y − α logL− logw
measures firm-specific productivity, since an aggregate productivity shock must also
increase w. Hence, the proposition shows that h can be measured by the correla-
tion between a firm-specific shock and labor input. It means that an appropriate
adaptation to a firm-specific shock can be interpreted as evidence of high prediction
ability1. Since a firm-specific shock is idiosyncratic, the information needed to adapt
1In fact, Takii (2003b) argues that h can be interpreted as the measure of adaptability.
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the shock must be local information. Takii (2004) estimates the measure of predic-
tion ability and conducts an empirical study, which provides evidence that supports
the prediction of this paper. We refer to Takii (2004) for more discussion of the
empirical implementation of the model.
Macroeconomic effects of entrepreneurship: Using this measure, z (h) can be
decomposed into productivity, risk and prediction ability. The proof is given in the
Appendix.
Theorem 8 For any ka ∈ (0,∞), a rise in h increases GDP per worker in an
economy, ya:
ya = zeφ (ka) exp
"
ασ2uh
2 (1− α)
#
. (11)
The theorem provides an operational model of entrepreneurship in macroeco-
nomics. It explicitly shows how prediction ability influences the TFP of the aggre-
gate production function. Since the aggregate production function is a cornerstone
of the neoclassical growth model, the theorem potentially can be applied to broad
topics. One application is demonstrated in the next section.
4 Political Risk and Entrepreneurship
In the previous section, it was argued that entrepreneurship can improve allocative
efficiency and the TFP of an economy, because when entrepreneurs predict changes in
their firms’ productivity correctly, they can equate the marginal products of inputs to
their prices. However, in this section, we use an example to show that if opportunities
are distorted, prediction ability can lower the TFP of an economy. For this purpose,
idiosyncratic distortions in Restuccia and Rogerson (2003) are introduced in our
model.
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Assume that government subsidizes firms and that all subsidies are financed by
income tax:
zi = (1− τ) (1 +Gi)
where τ is the constant average and marginal income tax rate and Gi is the subsidy
rate for the ith firm. The tax is proportional to output. Since output must be
equal to the sum of profits, wage payments and rental costs of capital, the tax is also
proportional to all of them in market equilibrium. Hence, τ is a short-cut expression of
a flat-rate income tax on all income of a representative household. It is also assumed
that the amount of subsidy is also proportional to output and that the technological
productivity of each firm is unity. A similar distortion appears in Restuccia and
Rogerson (2003). Their notion of ‘output tax’ is the same as our 1− zi. Restuccia
and Rogerson (2003) argue that ‘output tax’ allows us to analyze a generic family of
idiosyncratic distortions, which causes the reallocation of resources across firms.
The subsidy rate has two components: a predictable component g (Ri) and an
unpredictable component ui.
log (1 +Gi) = g (Ri) + ui
where Ri is the rent-seeking activity of the ith firm and ui is normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance σ2u. The random variable ui can be interpreted as a
political shock. Because political outcomes depend on the opinions, political tactics
and negotiations of politicians, the results are difficult to predict. The random factor,
ui, represents this uncertainty. It is assumed that Ri is chosen before entrepreneurs
observe signals and that the cost of rent-seeking activities is 0 when Ri ≤ R∗ and
infinite when Ri > R∗. Then, because entrepreneurs are identical, all choose the
same level of rent-seeking activity, Ri = R∗ and g (Ri) = g (R∗). If we set µ =
log (1− τ)+g (R∗), the analysis of the previous section is applicable in this context.
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There is an additional constraint that does not appear in the previous section, a
government’s budget constraint:
τ
Z
(1 +Gi) [f (k)L (si)]
α dQhus (ui, si)mN =
Z
Gi [f (k)L (si)]
α dQhus (ui, si)mN
(12)
where L(s), k and m are the market equilibrium solutions to the previous problem.
The right-hand side represents tax revenue and the left hand side represents total sub-
sidies. In order to satisfy equation (12), µ is endogenously determined. Rearranging
the equation, it is rewritten as
0 =
Z
(1− zi) [f (k)L (si)]α dQhzs (zi, si)mN. (13)
Note that
R
[f (k)L (si)]
α dQhzs (zi, si)mN and
R
zi [f (k)L (si)]
α dQhzs (zi, si)mN are
the values of aggregate output before and after the transfer of income, respectively.
Hence, equation (13) requires that the income transfer does not change aggregate
output. However, since L (s) is chosen when entrepreneurs expect income transfer,
the value of aggregate output before the income transfer takes place is affected by
entrepreneurs’ predictions of the realization of the political shock. The following
theorem shows that an increase in firms’ prediction ability lowers TFP when there is
political risk. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 9 Suppose that µ satisfies equation (13 ). Then, for any ka ∈ (0,∞), a
rise in h reduces GDP per unit of effective labor in an economy, ya:
ya = φ (ka) exp
"
−ασ2uh
2 (1− α)
#
. (14)
Political risk reduces TFP because political risk generates a negative externality:
when an entrepreneur is good at taking opportunities, there are fewer opportunities
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for others. In fact, it is shown that when equation (13) is satisfied, µ is chosen to
satisfy
µ =
−ασ2uh
(1− α) −
σ2u
2
.
Although individual entrepreneurs react to the political shock given µ, since these
reactions do not produce new value in the economy, prediction ability lowers µ to
satisfy equation (13). This generates a negative externality.
Two comments are warranted. First, equation (14) shows that, if there is no
political risk, competition between pressure groups leads to efficient allocation, as
suggested by Becker (1983). More importantly, equation (14) shows that if there is
political risk, even if rent-seeking activities are costless, political uncertainty can con-
fuse entrepreneurs and thereby lower productivity. That is, entrepreneurship might
have a detrimental effect on the economy in the presence of political risk. Hence,
the social welfare loss due to rent-seeking activities may have been underestimated
by the existing literature.
5 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper models firms’ entrepreneurial ability by the ability to predict changes in
the productivity of firms, which is aimed at capturing the soundness of firms’ judg-
ment about economic impacts of changes in the environment, and analyzes how entre-
preneurship influence the aggregate economy. We have shown that greater prediction
ability raises total factor productivity (TFP) in a competitive economy. However,
greater prediction ability may lower TFP if opportunities are distorted.
An advantage of the model is that we can empirically examine its predictions.
Takii (2004) conducts an empirical study with this model. Using data from the Cen-
sus of Manufacturing in Japan, 1985—1999, Takii (2004) estimates firms’ prediction
ability and examines the effect of prediction ability on TFP by prefecture and indus-
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try. Takii (2004) suggests that a rise in prediction ability had a small but significant
positive impact on TFP growth in Japan during that period.
Several extensions are being considered. First, although it has been assumed for
simplicity that all shocks are idiosyncratic and not persistent, this assumption leads
us to underestimate the importance of entrepreneurship. An election or a revolution
represents an aggregate political shock. The introduction of new technology probably
generates persistent shocks. Incorporating these shocks into the model would be an
interesting extension.
Finally, it would be interesting to examine the extent to which a distorted reward
structure for entrepreneurs might reduce TFP. Macroeconomists have recently found
that differences in unexplained exogenous productivity in the aggregate production
function explain a high proportion of income differences between countries [e.g., Hall
and Jones (1999) and Prescott (1998)]. Because the model in this paper relates
entrepreneurs’ rent-seeking activities to TFP, it may provide a suitable empirical
framework within which to examine the extent to which rent-seeking activities explain
these problems.
6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2: From the two resource constraints, (7) and (8), k can be
expressed as a function of the aggregate capital stock per unit of effective labor in an
economy:
k =
ka
1−m, (15)
where ka = K
a
N
. From equations (3), (6) and (8), we derive
1−m
m
=
α
1− α [1− θ (k)] , (16)
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where θ (k) ≡ f 0(k)k
f(k)
∈ (0, 1). Define a function G (m, k):
G (m,ka) ≡ α
1− α
"
1− θ
Ã
ka
1−m
!#
− 1−m
m
(17)
We must show that for any ka ∈ (0,∞), there exists an m ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies
G (m, ka) = 0. (18)
It can be shown that limm→0G (m, ka) < 0 since when m converges to 0, the second
term of equation (17) goes to ∞ and the first term is finite. When m converges
to 1, the second term of equation (17) goes to 0 and the first term is positive, since
limk→∞ θ (k) < 1 by assumption. This proves that there exists an m∗ ∈ (0, 1) that
satisfies equation (18). Moreover, the solution m∗ is unique, since it can be shown
that
G1 (m,k
a) |G(m,ka)=0
=
1
m (1−m)
∙
1−m
m
− αm
1− αθ
0 (k) k
¸
=
1
m (1−m)
α
1− α [1− θ (k)−mθ
0 (k) k] (19)
=
1
m (1−m)
α
1− α
(
1− θ (k)−mθ (k)
"
1− θ (k) + f
00 (k) k
f 0 (k)
#)
(20)
=
1
m (1−m)
α
1− α
(
[1− θ (k)] [1−mθ (k)]−mf
00 (k) k
f 0 (k)
θ (k)
)
> 0. (21)
The derivation of the second equation uses G (m,ka) = 0 and the derivation of the
third equation uses the definition of θ (k). Given m, equation (15) uniquely solves for
k, and, given a unique k, equation (3) uniquely solves for w
r
. Equations (1), (7) and
(8) imply that
1−m
m
=
Z ∙Z
zdQh (z|s)
¸ 1
1−α
dQhs (s)
"
αf (k)α
w + rk
# 1
1−α
. (22)
Given unique values of w
r
and k, this equation uniquely solves for r and, therefore,
also uniquely solves for w. Finally, given unique values of w, r and k, equation (1)
uniquely solves for L (s). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3: Aggregate output per unit of effective labor in an economy,
ya, can be expressed as follows:
ya =
mNy
R
L (s) dQhs (s)
N
, (23)
where y =
R Y (zs)
L(s)
dQhzs (z, s). Since it can be shown that y =
w+rk
α , substituting this
equation and equation (8) into equation (23) yields
ya =
w + rk
α
(1−m) . (24)
Rearranging equation (22) yields
w + rk
α
=
"Z ∙Z
zdQh (z|s)
¸ 1
1−α
dQhs (s)
#(1−α)
f
Ã
k
(1−m)
!α µ
m
1−m
¶(1−α)
.
Applying this equation to equation (24) yields the desired result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: The definition of φ (ka) implies that
φ0 (ka) = αf (k)α−1
µ
m
1−m
¶(1−α)
f 0 (k)D, (25)
where D ≡
"
1 + k
dm
dka
#
+
f (k)
f 0 (k)
"
(1− α) (1−m)
αm
− 1
#
dm
dka
.
Equation (18) implies D = 1. Hence φ0 (ka) > 0.
To examine the second derivative, note that the first derivative can be rewritten
as
φ0 (ka) = α
θ (k)φ (ka)
ka
. (26)
Hence the second derivative can be written as
φ00 (ka) = M
φ0 (ka)
θ (k) ka
where M = θ0 (k)
dk
dka
ka − θ (k) [1− αθ (k)]
Hence, the sign of φ00 (ka) is the same as that of M . To determine the sign of M ,
two lemmas are required.
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Lemma 10 The sign of m0 (ka) is determined by the sign of θ0 (k):
m0 (ka) =
θ0 (k)m
1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km.
Proof. Equation (18) implies that
m0 (ka) = −G2 (m, k
a) |G(m,ka)=0
G1 (m, ka) |G(m,ka)=0
=
− α
1−α
1
1−mθ
0 (k)
1
m(1−m)
α
1−α [1− θ (k)−mθ
0 (k) k]
,
=
θ0 (k)m
1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km.
The derivation of the second equation uses equation (19). Equation (21) shows that
1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km is positive.
Lemma 11 A rise in ka increases k:
dk
dka
=
1− θ (k)
(1−m) (1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km) > 0
Proof. Equation (15) implies that
dk
dka
=
1 + km0 (ka)
1−m .
The desired result follows from Lemma 10.
Applying Lemma 11 to the definition of M , the following equation is derived:
M =
θ0 (k) [1− θ (k)] k − θ (k) [1− αθ (k)] (1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km)
1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km .
Now equations (19) and (20) imply
θ0 (k) k = θ (k)
"
1− θ (k) + f
00 (k) k
f 0 (k)
#
,
and equation (19) and (21) imply
1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km = [1− θ (k)] [1−mθ (k)]−mf
00 (k) k
f 0 (k)
θ (k) .
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Hence the numerator becomes:
θ0 (k) [1− θ (k)] k − θ (k) [1− αθ (k)] (1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km)
= θ (k) [1− θ (k)] [1− θ (k)− (1− αθ (k)) (1−mθ (k))]
+θ (k)
f 00 (k) k
f 0 (k)
[1− θ (k) + (1− αθ (k))mθ (k)]
= θ (k)2 [1− θ (k)] [α+m− 1− αmθ (k)]
+θ (k)
f 00 (k) k
f 0 (k)
[1− θ (k) + (1− αθ (k))mθ (k)]
Equation (18) implies that α+m− 1− αmθ (k) = 0. Hence M < 0, and therefore,
φ00 (ka) < 0.
Equation (18) also implies that limk→0 θ (k) < 1 guarantees that limka→0m (ka) ∈
(0, 1). Hence, limka→0 φ (ka) = 0 since limk→0 f (k) = 0, and limk→0 φ
0 (k) =∞ since
equation (25) implies that limk→0 f (k) = 0 and limk→0 f 0 (k) = ∞ guarantee this.
Equation (18) also implies that limk→∞ θ (k) < 1 guarantees that limka→∞m (ka) ∈
(0, 1). Hence, equation (25) proves limk→∞ φ0 (k) = 0 since limk→∞ f 0 (k) = 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 8: Applying the standard Bayesian updating technique, it can
be shown that Z
udQhu (u|s) = hs,
V ar (u|s) = (1− h)σ2u.
Using these results,
R
zdF (z|s) can be expressed as follows:Z
zdQh (z|s) = ze exp
"
hs− σ
2
uh
2
#
, (27)
where ze = exp
³
µ+ σ
2
u
2
´
. Since the variance of s is σ2u + σ
2
ε, this can be written as
σ2u
h
. Using this result, it is easy to show that"Z ∙Z
zdQh (z|s)
¸ 1
1−α
dQhs (s)
#(1−α)
= ze exp
ασ2uh
2 (1− α) .
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Hence, the desired result follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 9: To prove the theorem, the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 12 Equation (13) is equivalent to
Z ∙Z
zidQ
h (zi|si)
¸ α
1−α
dQhs (s) =
Z ∙Z
zidQ
h (z|s)
¸ 1
1−α
dQhs (s)
Proof. Since L (s) satisfies equation (1),
Z
(1− zi) [f (k)L (s)]α dQhzs (z, s)m
=
Z
(1− zi)
∙Z
zidQ
h (zi|si)
¸ α
1−α
dQhzs (z, s)
"
αf (k)
w + rk
# α
1−α
m
Hence, equation (13) implies
0 =
Z
(1− zi)
∙Z
zidQ
h (zi|si)
¸ α
1−α
dQhzs (z, s) .
The desired result follows.
Since log z = µ+ u, equation (27) implies that
Z µZ
zidQ
h (zi|si)
¶ 1
1−α
dQhs (si) = (z
e)
1
1−α exp
ασ2uh
(1− α)2
,
and Z µZ
zidQ
h (zi|si)
¶ α
1−α
dQhs (si) = (z
e)
α
1−α exp
α (2α− 1)σ2uh
2 (1− α)2
,
where ze = exp
³
µ+ σ
2
u
2
´
. Using lemma 12, ze can be solved for as a function of h
and σ2u:
ze = exp
−ασ2uh
(1− α) .
The desired result follows from theorem 8. Q.E.D.
24
References
[1] Bartelsman, Eric J. and Doms, Mark (2000), “Understanding Productivity:
Lessons from Longitudinal Microdata,” Journal of Economic Literature, 569—
594.
[2] Baumol, William J. (1990), “Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and
Destructive,” Journal of Political Economy, 98, 893—921.
[3] Becker, Gary S. (1983),“A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (3), 371—400.
[4] Blackwell, D. (1953). “Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments,” Annals of
Mathematical Statistics, June, 265—272.
[5] Davis, Steven J. and Haltiwanger, John (1999), “Gross Job Flows,” In Handbook
of Labor Economics, Volume 3, edited by Ashenfelter, Orley and Card, David,
Amsterdam, North- Holland, 2711—2805.
[6] Eckwert, Bernhard and Zilcha, Itzhak (2001), “The Value of Information in
Production Economies,” Journal of Economic Theory, 100, 172—186.
[7] Hall, Robert E. and Jones, Charles I. (1999), “ Why do Some Countries Pro-
duce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 83—116.
[8] Hayek, Friedrich (1945), “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic
Review, 519—530.
[9] Hirshleifer, Jack (1971) “The Private and Social Value of Information and the
Reward to Inventive Activity,” American Economic Review, 61, 561—574.
25
[10] Holmes, T. J. and Schmitz, J. A. (1990), “A Theory of Entrepreneurship and its
Application to the Study of Business Transfers,” Journal of Political Economy
98, 265—294.
[11] Holmes, Thomas J and Schmitz, James A. Jr. (2001), “A Gain from Trade: From
Unproductive to Productive Entrepreneurship,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
47, 417—446.
[12] Kirzner (1973), Competition and Entrepreneurship, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press.
[13] Lucas, Robert E. (1978),“On the Size Distribution of Business Firms,” Bell Jour-
nal of Economics, 9, 508—523.
[14] Murphy, Kevin M., Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. (1991), “The Al-
location of Talent: Implications for Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
503—530.
[15] Prescott Edward C. (1998), “Lawrence R. Klein Lecture 1997, Needed: A The-
ory of Total Factor Productivity,” International Economic Review, 39, 525—551.
[16] Diego, Restuccia and Richard, Rogerson (2003), “Policy Distortions and Aggre-
gate Productivity with Heterogeneous Plants, ” unpublished.
[17] Schultz, Theodore W. (1975), “The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequi-
libria,” Journal of Economic Literature, 13, 827—846.
[18] Takii, Katsuya (2003a), “Prediction Ability,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 6,
80—98.
[19] Takii, Katsuya (2003b) “Entrepreneurial Efficiency,” OSIPP Discussion Paper:
DP-2003-E-010
26
[20] Takii, Katsuya (2004) “Entrepreneurial Efficiency: An Empirical Framework and
Evidence,” OSIPP Discussion Paper: DP-2004-E-006.
[21] Tullock, G. (1967), “The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft,” West-
ern Economic Journal 5, 224—232.
27
